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Much theoretical attention is currently devoted to social learning. Yet, empirical studies
formally comparing its effectiveness relative to individual learning are rare. Here, we focus
on free choice, which is at the heart of individual reward-based learning, but absent in
social learning. Choosing among two equally valued options is known to create a prefer-
ence for the selected option in both humans and monkeys. We thus surmised that social
learning should be more helpful when choice-induced preferences retard individual learn-
ing than when they optimize it.To test this prediction, the same task requiring to find which
among two items concealed a reward was applied to rhesus macaques and humans. The
initial trial was individual or social, rewarded or unrewarded. Learning was assessed on
the second trial. Choice-induced preference strongly affected individual learning. Monkeys
and humans performed much more poorly after an initial negative choice than after an ini-
tial positive choice. Comparison with social learning verified our prediction. For negative
outcome, social learning surpassed or at least equaled individual learning in all subjects.
For positive outcome, the predicted superiority of individual learning did occur in a major-
ity of subjects (5/6 monkeys and 6/12 humans). A minority kept learning better socially
though, perhaps due to a more dominant/aggressive attitude toward peers. Poor learning
from errors due to over-valuation of personal choices is among the decision-making biases
shared by humans and animals. The present study suggests that choice-immune social
learning may help curbing this potentially harmful tendency. Learning from successes is
an easier path. The present data suggest that whether one tends to walk it alone or with
a peer’s help might depend on the social dynamics within the actor/observer dyad.
Keywords: social learning, reinforcement learning, cognitive biases, choice-induced preference, rhesus macaques,
humans
INTRODUCTION
Social species, like rhesus macaques and humans, have two main
ways of coping with novel problems. They can either learn to dis-
tinguish between good and bad choices individually (i.e., through
their own experience) or, alternatively, they can rely on social
learning (Miller and Dollard, 1941). Which of these two forms of
learning is more effective? This question has received a substantial
amount of theoretical attention, from both psychology and neigh-
boring disciplines such as ethology and economics. Most models
argue that the remarkable ability to learn from others’ successes
and failures not only saves effort and time, but also allows cul-
tural knowledge to accumulate over generations (Bandura, 1977;
Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981; Boyd and Richerson, 1985).
Other theoretical works, however, have reached the conclusion
that copying others is not per se a recipe for success (e.g., Laland,
2004; Valone, 2007; Rieucau and Giraldeau, 2011). These models
emphasize the prevalence of trade-offs in the use of social and
personal information and suggest that subjects exploit socially
transmitted information only where individual learning would be
risky or impossible (e.g., learning to escape predators; Giraldeau
et al., 2002; Kendal et al., 2005).
At the empirical level, several recent studies have provided
convincing evidence that trial-and-error reward-based learning
is faster in monkeys and humans when it is preceded by obser-
vation of an expert or novice conspecific (Brosnan and de Waal,
2004; Subiaul et al., 2004, 2007; Meunier et al., 2007). These stud-
ies, however, compared individual learning with vs. without prior
observation of others. They did not attempt to determine whether
the exact same amount of information yields better learning when
acquired socially than when obtained individually. To our knowl-
edge, only two studies, both carried out in humans, performed
such controlled comparison of the effectiveness of social and indi-
vidual learning and they led to opposite conclusions. Rendell et al.
(2010) described a case where the most successful strategy for
learning relied almost exclusively on copying. In contrast, Nicolle
et al. (2011) reported a case where social learning was less effective
than individual learning. In sum, despite the large amount of the-
oretical attention devoted to social learning benefits and pitfalls,
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controlled empirical evaluations of the relative effectiveness of
social vs. individual learning remain rare, limited to humans, and
of mixed results. The current study enriches this scarce empirical
knowledge. Its aim was to identify a strong predictor of differences
in relative effectiveness of these two forms of learning.
Literature to date has ignored a major difference between indi-
vidual and social learning: free choice, which is at the very heart of
feedback-based learning, is simply absent in social learning. Some
variations in effectiveness between individual and social learning
could stem from this major difference. The mere act of choos-
ing between equally valued options creates, rather than reflects, a
preference. In his seminal paper, Brehm (1956) presented partic-
ipants with a set of daily-life articles and they were asked to rate
each of them based on its desirability. After performing this rat-
ing, participants were given the choice between two of these objects
previously evaluated as equally attractive. Subjects were then asked
to rate each of the articles again. Results showed that, after mak-
ing the difficult choice between two equally preferred alternatives,
people tended to like the selected item more and the rejected item
less than they originally did. Further studies amply confirmed this
tendency in humans (e.g., Festinger and Carlsmith, 1959; Gerard
and White, 1983; Jones, 1985; Ariely and Norton, 2008; Sharot
et al., 2009, 2010; Izuma et al., 2010; Johansson et al., 2012), and
one recent study demonstrated that it exists in monkeys as well
(Egan et al., 2007; see also Egan et al., 2010).
This propensity to reevaluate the intrinsic value of choice alter-
natives, known in social psychology as choice-induced preference,
also accounts for a robust learning bias classically observed in
object discrimination learning. Faced with two equally neutral
objects, one leading to a reward, the other not, individuals from
several species (rhesus monkeys: Riopelle et al., 1954; Riopelle,
1955, 1960; Itoh et al., 2001; cats: Warren, 1959; humans: van Dui-
jvenvoorde et al., 2008; baboons and pigeons: Cook and Fagot,
2009) are far less likely to learn if they happen to select the neg-
ative object during their initial choice than when they initially
pick the positive object. When the initial choice proves incorrect,
choice-induced attraction for the negative item considerably slows
subsequent learning.
We therefore used an object discrimination task to test the idea
that the effectiveness of social learning can be predicted by the
influence of free choice on individual learning. Specifically, we
surmised that when a choice-induced preference hinders individ-
ual learning (i.e., after initial selection of the negative item), social
learning should prove advantageous; conversely, when a choice-
induced preference eases individual learning (i.e., after initial
selection of the positive item), social learning should prove infe-
rior. The same task was applied to humans and rhesus macaques in
order to demonstrate that this variation in social learning effective-
ness is a phylogenetically ancient trend that arose over evolution
and operates regardless of language, culture, and experience.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
SUBJECTS
Monkeys
Two groups, each comprising three captive-born rhesus macaques
(Macaca mulatta), participated to the study. One group was com-
posed of 4-year-old males, the other of 3-year-old females. Each
group was tested in its usual living quarters. The male group lived
in a large indoor/outdoor enclosure and was tested outdoors (see
Meunier et al., 2007). The female group was laboratory-housed
and was tested indoors in the communicating individual cages
they shared. During testing, all three group members were present,
each in a separate compartment, the two members playing the
observer and actor roles being placed either at a 90˚ angle (male
group) or face to face (female group). Each monkey was tested with
the partner he/she was the most willing to work with. Monkeys
were not food-deprived; they were fed after testing completion
but received their normal food rations of fresh fruits and mon-
key chow. Water was always available. All procedures involving
monkeys were in accordance with the European Community’s
Council Directive for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals
(86/609/EEC).
Humans
Six subjects were recruited and asked to come with a companion of
their choice. The study thus involved a total of 12 human subjects,
eight males and six females (mean age± SEM: 31± 2 years, range
24–53). Consent was obtained from each subject. All procedures
involving humans were in accordance with the French Law (Titer
I and II du Code de la Santé Publique).
APPARATUS
A test tray equipped with two food wells was used to confront
monkeys and humans to pairs of objects. For the male monkey
group (outdoor testing), the tray was hidden under a large bucket
while the experimenter positioned the objects and reward. For
the female monkey group (indoor testing), the tray was mounted
on a wheeled cart equipped on each side with two screens, one
opaque and one transparent, allowing the experimenter to control
what the two animals situated on each side of the apparatus could
see or do. For humans, the tray was mounted on a wheeled cart
equipped with an opaque screen on one side; the experimenter sat
on the open side of the apparatus while the observer and the actor
sat side by side on the screened side. Note that subjects, mon-
keys and humans, were never tested alone; differences observed
across conditions cannot therefore be attributed to the social facil-
itation/inhibition phenomenon triggered by the mere presence
or absence of another’s subject, which is well-known in humans
(Bond and Titus, 1983) and also exists in monkeys (Addessi and
Visalberghi, 2001; Dindo et al., 2009).
TASK PRINCIPLE
Lists of several pairs of stimuli were used. The pairs composing
the list were presented one after the other, always in the same
order. Within each pair, one of the two objects always led to
a positive outcome (a reward), the other always to a negative
outcome (lack of reward). The left/right position of the posi-
tive object was pseudo-randomized across presentations. Mon-
keys were trained, and humans were asked, to displace only
one of the two objects per trial and no correction procedure
was applied after an error. Monkeys’ preliminary training was
the same as in earlier studies using real objects (e.g., Meunier
et al., 1993, 1997, 2007). It generally lasted 4–6 days and con-
sisted in presenting first a single baited object until the ani-
mal readily displaced it to retrieve the candy, and then two
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objects one baited, one unbaited, until the animal understood
that he/she was not allowed to displace the second object after
an unrewarded first choice and that correct responses were deter-
mined by the object and not by its spatial location. Prelimi-
nary training was successful inasmuch as monkeys showed no
spatial bias on the first testing session making 49.7± 0.2% of
right-sided responses (one-sample t -test relative to 50%: t 5= 0.1,
p= 0.90).
During testing, two types of trial 1, experienced and observed,
were mixed within each list as detailed in the Procedure section
below. In the first case (individual learning), the subject was
given access to the test tray and could freely choose one between
the two-presented items. In the second case (social learning),
he/she was provided with the opportunity to observe and ben-
efit from his/her companion’s choice. In both learning con-
ditions, reward was manipulated unbeknownst to subjects so
that, over the course of the experiment, the actor experienced
and the model demonstrated an equal number of correct and
incorrect choices on trial 1. A reward was concealed under
both objects to obtain a correct trial 1, whereas neither object
was rewarded to obtain an incorrect trial 1. This manipulation
enforced a 50% chance performance on trial 1 in each learning
condition.
Monkeys were not taught (and humans were not instructed)
to observe their companion. The study relied for both species on
subjects’ spontaneous willingness to observe a peer’s behavior. The
percent correct response on trial 2 was compared across groups
to determine the effectiveness of social learning vs. individual
learning.
PROCEDURE
Monkeys
Stimuli were real objects (toys, cardboard boxes, plastic contain-
ers, etc.). Rewards were chocolate candies. Each list comprised
nine pairs. Within each list, stimuli varied in shape, size, texture,
and color. Each monkey learned a total of 10 lists over 10 separate
sessions. A very large pool of objects was constituted to ensure
that each individual saw a different list each time he/she partici-
pated as actor or model. For each session (Figure 1), the model first
showed six pairs with three successes and three errors appearing in
pseudo-random order. Then, three additional pairs were inserted
in the list, and this now complete list was given to the actor. The
actor monkey actually completed the full list 10 times, but only
the first and second encounters with a pair (trials 1 and 2) will be
considered in the present study.
Humans
At completion of the monkey experiment, a pilot study was car-
ried out in humans. Stimuli and procedure were tailored to equate
the level of difficulty across species. The main difficulty was to
circumvent humans’ tendency to create verbal labels for stimulus-
outcome associations and rehearse them during inter-trial inter-
vals. Two changes were thus introduced relative to the monkey
task. First, stimuli were computer-generated complex geometric
patterns printed on 10 cm× 10 cm cardboard plaques. Second,
humans were to search for the object concealing a reward (a 0.20C
coin) in each stimuli pair they were presented with and, at the
same time, to listen to stories (tales from the “Just So Stories”
by Rudyard Kipling) in order to answer a quiz at the end of the
FIGURE 1 | Sketches illustrating the task principle. Monkeys are
shown but the principle was the same for humans. Subjects were
tested in dyads on an object discrimination task. Pairs of objects were
presented on a tray equipped with two food wells. Each pair contained
a positive item and a negative one. The goal was to find the positive
item to obtain the reward concealed underneath. Trial 1 (left panel) was
either actively performed (individual learning, up) or passively
witnessed (social learning, bottom). In both conditions, equal numbers
of successes and errors were obtained by baiting both wells for half
the trials and none of the wells for the other half. The relative
effectiveness of individual vs. social learning was assessed, separately
for each outcome, by measuring subjects’ percent correct responses
on a second trial (right panel). Subjects actually learned lists of several
object pairs in order to test all four types of trial 1 (individual/social,
negative/positive) within each testing session (cf. Procedure in Material
and Methods).
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session, each question correctly answered earning an additional
0.20C reward (total gains ranged from 15 to 25C per volunteer
depending on performance). Otherwise, human testing followed
the same principle as monkey testing. Each list comprised eight
pairs. Within each list, stimuli varied in shape, but were of the
same overall size and color. Each human dyad learned a total of 20
different lists over two separate daily sessions, 10 lists per subject,
five per day. Each list was used only once. For each session, the
model first showed four pairs with two successes and two errors
appearing in pseudo-random order. Then, four additional pairs
were inserted either at the beginning or at the end of the list, and
the now complete list was given to the actor twice. The study was
presented as a memory experiment to the human volunteers and
the request to come with a companion was explained away by the
necessity to maintain the same testing conditions as in a parallel
monkey study. Concealing the real aim of the experiment ensured
that, like monkeys, humans watched their companion’s choices
only if spontaneously compelled to do so.
SOCIAL INTERACTIONS EVALUATION
Monkeys
Social interactions within our two monkey trios were evaluated
by testing each animal twice, once with each peer. During testing,
the two animals were placed in the same compartment in presence
of, but separated from the remaining group member. The first test
consisted in delivering 10 food treats at equal distance from the two
animals. The total number of eaten treats determined the animal’s
rank, the monkey that ate the largest number of treats being attrib-
uted rank 1. The second snapshot of the social hierarchy within
each group was obtained by videotaping dyadic interactions for
10 min after an overnight separation to promote social contacts.
The duration of aggressive (e.g., receive/give chasing) and affil-
iative (e.g., receive/give grooming) behaviors were scored using
Noldus software The Observer®XT10. A rank was attributed for
each recorded behavior following known behavioral expressions
of social status in macaques e.g., receiving the most grooming
yielded rank 1 (Shively, 1998; Stavisky et al., 2001). In the present
study, ranking was actually based on affiliation because aggression
seldom occurred in the recorded samples. Then, the overall rank
of each monkey was determined by averaging the ranks across all
observed behaviors.
Humans
To probe interactions within our human dyads, we used a French
questionnaire designed by Chalvin (1999, 2009). Subjects self-
assessed their way of interacting with others by answering yes
or no to 60 statements. Positive answers fell into four categories:
assertive, passive, aggressive, or manipulative behaviors (score max
per category= 15).
DATA ANALYSIS
Each monkey learned a total of 90 pairs, trial 1 being observed for
60 pairs (30 with positive outcome and 30 with negative outcome)
and experienced for the remaining 30 pairs (15 with positive out-
come and 15 with negative outcome). Each human learned a total
of 80 pairs, trial 1 being experienced for 40 pairs (20 with posi-
tive outcome and 20 with negative outcome) and observed for the
remaining 40 pairs (20 with positive outcome and 20 with negative
outcome). Scores, i.e., the percent correct responses on trial 2,
were calculated for individual and social learning, for each species
(monkeys and humans) and for each outcome (positive and neg-
ative) and then analyzed using two learning× two species× two
outcome ANOVAs and one-sample, two-sample, or paired t -tests
as appropriate.
To quantify the advantage or disadvantage conferred by social
learning over individual learning, we calculated two learning ∆s
(social score – individual score/individual score) per subject, one
for each outcome. Positive ∆s indicated that social learning was
advantageous, negative ∆s that individual learning was optimal.
Then, Pearson’s correlations were performed, within and across
species, on these learning∆s to determine whether they were best
predicted by individual or by social learning scores, that is, whether
social learning effectiveness varied with personal learning skills
or, alternatively, depended on the social dynamics existing within
the dyad.
RESULTS
INDIVIDUAL LEARNING
When trial 1 involved a choice (Figure 2A; Table 1), the two
species achieved their best performance after a positive outcome
[main effect of outcome: F(1,16)= 88.8, p< 0.001]. Monkeys and
humans reached 70 and 68% correct responses, respectively, two
statistically indistinguishable scores suggesting that task difficulty
was successfully equated across species. Performance plummeted
after a negative outcome and this decrease was larger in monkeys
than in humans [main effect of species: F(1,16)= 5.9, p= 0.03;
species× outcome interaction: F(1,16)= 11.3, p= 0.004]. Mon-
keys indeed managed only 33% correct responses after a negative
outcome, a 37% loss relative to positive outcome, compared to
51% correct responses, and a 17% loss, for humans (see Figure 2A
for post hoc comparisons).
SOCIAL LEARNING
When monkeys were given the opportunity to observe another’s
choice on trial 1, the direction of the outcome effect was reversed
(Figure 2B; Table 1). There, the two species achieved their best
performance after a negative outcome. Monkeys reached 67% cor-
rect responses and humans 78% correct responses, compared to
54 and 73% correct responses, respectively, after a positive out-
come. However, this time, the outcome effect was not reliable
[main effect: F(1,16)= 3.8, p= 0.07; species× outcome interac-
tion: F(1,16)= 0.7, p= 0.41]. Neither the 13% drop observed in
monkeys, nor the 5% drop observed in humans was significant
(see post hoc comparisons in Figure 2B). Only the main effect of
species reached significance [F(1,16)= 6.0, p= 0.03] as monkeys
learned less from peers than humans irrespective of the outcome.
One-sample t -test were used to determine whether social scores
were superior to the 50% chance performance one would expect
on trial 2 if subjects paid no attention whatsoever to their com-
panion’s choices and outcomes on trial 1. Monkey’s 54% social
score after a positive outcome did not differ from chance (t 5= 0.7,
p= 0.51), but their 67% score after a negative outcome did
(t 5= 4.5, p= 0.007). In humans, both scores were well above
chance (73% after a positive outcome and 78% after a negative out-
come, t 11= 3.9, p= 0.002, and t 11= 9.0, p< 0.001, respectively).
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FIGURE 2 | Overall performance on trial 2 in monkeys (left) and
humans (right) for individual (A) and social (B) learning after a single
negative vs. positive outcome. Scores are% correct responses
(mean±SEM). Asterisks denote within-species differences as revealed by
paired t -tests, ***p<0.001, black dots indicate between-species
differences as revealed by two-sample t -tests. •p≤0.05, •••p=0.003. Note
that both species learned best from positive outcome, individually, and
from negative outcome, socially.
Subjects from both species thus did gain some knowledge from
their companions albeit not trained/instructed to do so.
PREDICTION 1: WHEN FREE CHOICE HINDERS INDIVIDUAL LEARNING,
SOCIAL LEARNING IS OPTIMAL
According to our hypothesis, negative outcome on trial 1 epit-
omizes situations for which social learning should be optimal;
therefore, subjects from both species should show positive, or at
least null, learning ∆s. As illustrated in Figure 3A, this held true
for all monkeys (6/6) and all humans (12/12). Overall, learning
Table 1 | Individual scores (% correct responses) and species averages
obtained on trial 2 for individual and social learning after a single
negative vs. positive outcome.
Group Gender Negative Positive
Individual Social Individual Social
Dyad 1 Male 50 90 65 95
Dyad 1 Female 40 65 65 40
Dyad 2 Male 50 90 65 95
Dyad 2 Male 40 95 65 40
Dyad 3 Female 50 75 60 80
Dyad 3 Female 50 85 80 80
Dyad 4 Male 50 75 60 80
Dyad 4 Male 55 80 80 70
Dyad 5 Female 40 75 65 85
Dyad 5 Male 60 65 85 85
Dyad 6 Female 70 70 65 75
Dyad 6 Female 55 65 60 45
Humans Average 51 78 68 73
Trio 1 Male 24 68 67 77
Trio 1 Male 39 71 83 59
Trio 1 Male 42 83 64 60
Trio 2 Female 21 60 75 47
Trio 2 Female 38 57 64 50
Trio 2 Female 38 63 64 33
Monkeys Average 33 67 70 54
Subjects appear in the same order as in Figures 3A,B, the top line corresponding
to the leftmost bar in each graph.
Bold indicates the average scores for humans and monkeys.
∆s averaged+0.57 in humans (range: 0–1.37) and+1.11 in mon-
keys (range: 0.51–1.88). Both group scores significantly differed
from 0 (one-sample t -tests: both t ’s> 4.7, both p’s< 0.006), con-
firming that social learning was significantly more effective than
individual learning in the two species. The group scores also dif-
fered from each other (two-sample t -tests: t 16= 2.4, p= 0.03), as
social learning superiority was more marked in monkeys than in
humans.
PREDICTION 2: WHEN FREE CHOICE EASES INDIVIDUAL LEARNING,
SOCIAL LEARNING IS NOT OPTIMAL
According to our hypothesis, positive outcome on trial 1 epito-
mizes situations for which individual learning should be optimal;
therefore, both species should show negative, or at least null, learn-
ing∆s. As illustrated in Figure 3B, this held true for 5/6 monkeys
and for half of the human subjects, one per dyad. The other
members of the human dyads and the remaining monkey showed
unexpected positive learning ∆s. In the former 11 subjects (six
humans and five monkeys), learning ∆s averaged −0.23, com-
pared to +0.31 in the remaining seven subjects (six humans and
one monkey). Both measures significantly differed from 0 (one-
sample t -tests: both t ’s> 7.4, both p’s< 0.001). Thus, for positive
outcome, our prediction that choice-induced preference would
boost individual learning and make it surpass social learning,
proved correct for a majority (61%) of subjects.
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FIGURE 3 | Effectiveness of social relative to individual learning after a
single negative (A) or positive (B) outcome as measured by learning
∆s (social score – individual score/individual score). Positive ∆s indicate
that social learning is better than individual learning, negative ∆s that it is
worse. Each bar corresponds to one subject. Humans are organized per
dyad as they were tested. Monkeys are grouped per trio of housemates
following their rank in the hierarchy with the top ranking on the left, each
monkey within a trio was tested with one or both of his/her partner
according to affinities. Any given subject occupies the same position in (A)
and in (B). Note the smaller scale and greater data heterogeneity in (B).
PERSONAL ORIGIN OF INTER-INDIVIDUAL VARIABILITY AFTER A
NEGATIVE OUTCOME
For negative outcome, the 18 subjects were distributed along a
continuum between two extremes: one human for whom social
and individual learning were equally effective (0∆ in Figure 3A,
dyad 6) and one monkey for whom social learning was three
times better than individual learning (+1.88∆ in Figure 3A, male
group). A subject’s position along this continuum was deter-
mined by his/her personal learning skills. Indeed, learning ∆s
were tightly correlated with individual and not with social learn-
ing scores. This held true for monkeys (r =−0.90, p= 0.01),
humans (r =−0.83, p= 0.001) and the two species taken together
(r =−0.87, p< 0.001). The negative correlation indicated that the
greater the subject’s difficulty to correct personal errors, the more
social learning surpassed individual learning.
SOCIAL ORIGIN OF INTER-INDIVIDUAL VARIABILITY AFTER A POSITIVE
OUTCOME
For positive outcome, inter-individual variability took the form
of a dichotomy opposing 11 subjects for whom individual learn-
ing was optimal as predicted (null to negative ∆s, “∆−subject”)
to seven subjects for whom, contrary to our prediction, social
learning was optimal (positive∆s,“∆+ subject”). As illustrated in
Figure 4, this time, learning ∆s were determined by social rather
than individual learning scores (monkeys: r = 0.93, p= 0.007;
humans: r = 0.91, p< 0.001; all: r = 0.93, p< 0.001). This correla-
tion, and the fact that the dichotomy was present in each and every
human dyad, suggested a social rather than a personal origin. What
distinguished ∆+ subjects from their ∆− companions? Findings
from the evaluations of the social dynamics within our dyads indi-
cate that ∆+ subjects might be more dominant/aggressive than
their∆− companions.
The one∆+monkey was the high-ranking animal of the male
group. His dominance scores stood out as he monopolized 85%
of the treats during the food competition test and systematically
ranked #1 on the interaction evaluation. By comparison, his coun-
terpart in the female group secured 70% of the food and a mean
rank of 1.8. In humans, the 6∆+ subjects were not more assertive
than their ∆− companions (11.7 vs. 11.2/15). They tended to
be less passive (7.7 vs. 10.0/15; t 10= 1.8, p= 0.10). However,
the main difference concerned their higher cumulated aggres-
sive/manipulative scores (15.8 vs. 11.0/30; t 10= 2.3, p= 0. 04).
For example, they were more likely to answer yes to the aggres-
sive statement “I often interrupt people without realizing it on
time” (5/6∆+ vs. 2/6∆−) and/or to the manipulative statement
“I know who to see and when to see him or her, it has helped me
a lot” (4/6∆+ vs. 0/6∆−).
DISCUSSION
The present study provides a controlled comparison of individual
and social learning using the same object discrimination learn-
ing task in macaques and humans. Results first strengthen the
idea that the phenomenon known in social psychology as choice-
induced preference does affect reward-based learning in the two
species. The very same monkeys and humans that, in the social sit-
uation, readily learned from their companions’ erroneous choice,
had great difficulty correcting their own erroneous choice. Fur-
thermore, the data largely confirm our hypothesis that the most
effective way to learn depends on choice influence on individ-
ual learning. When choice-induced preference retarded individual
learning (after a negative outcome), social learning proved opti-
mal for all subjects. By contrast, when choice-induced preference
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FIGURE 4 | Correlations between learning ∆s, on the one hand,
and individual (A) and social (B) learning scores after a single
positive outcome. How much a subject gained (positive ∆) or lost
(negative ∆) by learning socially rather than individually is totally
unrelated to his/her personal learning skills. For example, among the
nine human subjects who reached 60–65% correct responses
when learning by themselves, six gained 20–40% when learning
from his/her companion, while the other three lost 20–40%. Indeed,
for successes, social learning ∆s were determined by social scores
in both species suggesting that whether or not social learning was
advantageous for a subject depended on the social dynamics within
the group.
optimized individual learning (after a positive outcome), social
learning was less effective in most (though not all) subjects.
CHOICE-INDUCED PREFERENCE CONSEQUENCES ON REWARD-BASED
LEARNING
In discrimination tasks, as in many daily situations, subjects face
two alternatives, one good, one bad. A single trial, whether exe-
cuted or observed, should suffice to solve the problem irrespective
of its outcome. A positive outcome reveals the item one should
stick to, a negative one the item one should avoid. Yet, neither
animals nor humans behave in this rational way. Two sets of stud-
ies have compared learning from positive vs. negative outcome in
visual discrimination tasks. They reached opposite conclusions but
agreed that the first outcome affects subsequent learning. Stud-
ies focused on individual learning demonstrated that humans,
monkeys, cats, and pigeons learn best from (their own) suc-
cesses (Riopelle et al., 1954; Riopelle, 1955, 1960; Warren, 1959;
Mishkin, 1964; Itoh et al., 2001; van Duijvenvoorde et al., 2008;
Cook and Fagot, 2009). Studies focused on social learning showed
that macaques and birds learn best from (others’) errors (Darby
and Riopelle, 1959; Templeton, 1998; see also Vanayan et al., 1985;
Biederman and Vanayan, 1988). The latter phenomenon was con-
firmed by motor imitation studies in capuchins and human chil-
dren (Want and Harris, 2001; Kuroshima et al., 2008). The present
study reconciles these two sets of studies by providing a unifying
hypothesis solving their apparent contradiction. We found that
the very same monkey and human subjects that learn best from a
positive outcome individually indeed learned best from a negative
outcome socially. The first difference was marked and significant
in the two species, the second milder and non-significant. The fact
that choice is present in individual but not social learning could
account for both differences.
Early authors (Riopelle et al., 1954; Mishkin, 1964) assumed
that first-trial personal choices are dictated by preexisting attrac-
tions to one object that subsequently ease or retard individual
learning depending on whether the attractive object happens to
be positive or negative. Our reasoning for individual learning is
similar except that we do not postulate that a spontaneous prefer-
ence preexists in each subject for each and every possible pair of
objects. Rather, based on the social psychology literature detailed
in the Introduction, we propose that the preference that eases or
retards learning is created by choice itself. The advantage of this
view is that it applies to social learning as well, thereby explaining
the “error paradox,” viz. why the error that is a learning handicap
when personal becomes a learning aid when social.
When monkeys do not have to make the first-trial choice
themselves, they simply revert to another well-known tendency,
novelty seeking. This has been demonstrated long ago by Moss
and Harlow, 1947; see also Mishkin, 1964; Brown et al., 1965;
Deets et al., 1971; Blomquist et al., 1973). When the negative
object is presented alone on trial 1, monkeys excel in avoiding
it on subsequent trials because novelty seeking drives them away
from already explored items. Social learning is a no-choice situa-
tion where novelty seeking may operate in a vicarious way. In sum,
we propose that personal learning from errors is difficult because
choice and the preference it induces for the selected item lead
monkeys and humans to repeat whatever initial choice they made,
even when incorrect. By contrast, social learning from errors is easy
because choice absence leaves room for novelty seeking that fosters
responses away from the model’s erroneous first-trial choices.
Two human neuroimaging studies (Klein et al., 2007; van Dui-
jvenvoorde et al., 2008) indicate that learning from personal errors
involves the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, a region whose neurons
carry information from one choice to the next more accurately
after a positive than after a negative outcome (Histed et al., 2009).
Large dorsolateral prefrontal removals leave individual learning
from successes intact, selectively exacerbating monkeys’ difficulty
to learn from errors (Mishkin, 1964). Interestingly, ventral lesions
involving orbital areas 11/13 yield an even greater deficit raising
the possibility of a link between the (physiological) perseverative
www.frontiersin.org September 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 127 | 7
Monfardini et al. Social vs. individual learning effectiveness
tendency of healthy subjects after a personal error and the (patho-
logical) perseveration phenomenon that has long been associated
with orbital damage (Mishkin, 1964; but see Rygula et al., 2010;
Bachevalier et al., 2011; Rudebeck and Murray, 2011; Noonan et al.,
2012, for current qualifications). Whether selective orbital lesions
would increase difficulty to learn from personal errors while spar-
ing learning from social errors is an interesting question for future
monkey lesion studies to address.
CROSS-SPECIES COMPARISON: MACAQUES VS. HUMANS
Another original contribution of the present study is the direct
comparison of macaques with human adults using the same object
discrimination task. The task was difficult,maximum performance
reaching no more than 70–80% correct responses in either species.
Difficulty was successfully equated across species by using simpler
stimuli in monkeys (actual objects rather than complex patterns)
and a dual-task paradigm in humans (performing the discrim-
ination task while listening to children tales) to prevent verbal
rehearsing. Subiaul et al. (2007) found an equal benefit of obser-
vation in adult macaques and 2-year old human children. Likewise,
the present adult monkeys and adult humans behaved in a highly
similar manner, as emphasized in the preceding and following
paragraphs. Quite expectedly though, since we tested adults and
not toddlers, dissimilarities did emerge.
Social learning proficiency of human adults surpassed that
of macaques. This might be linked to better social attention as
macaques have been reported to pay less attention to peers than
chimpanzees, human children, and human adults (Rigamonti
et al., 2005; Custance et al., 2006). The second cross-species dissim-
ilarity was that monkeys’ difficulty to correct personal errors was
more marked than humans’. The odds against a correct response
on trial 2, already high in humans (1:1) were doubled (2:1) in mon-
keys. This phylogenic difference parallels the evolution described
across the lifespan in both species. Learning from personal errors
gradually improves from childhood to adulthood (van Duijvenvo-
orde et al., 2008) and then declines with aging (Itoh et al., 2001).
The ability to rein in choice-induced preferences thus seems to
evolve both across primate species, from monkeys to humans, and
within-species, from infancy to old age. This idea fits with the find-
ing evoked above that learning from personal errors in object dis-
crimination tasks requires the prefrontal cortex (Mishkin, 1964), a
brain region notably less developed in macaques than in humans
(Passingham, 1973; Schoenemann et al., 2005), and one of the
last brain regions to mature during development (Casey et al.,
2000).
SOCIAL LEARNING SUPERIORITY AFTER NEGATIVE OUTCOME IS
HIGHLY RELIABLE ACROSS SPECIES AND SUBJECTS
For negative outcome, the two species displayed positive learning
∆s reflecting the predicted superiority of social over individual
learning. The advantage provided by social learning is remarkable
in two respects: its scale and its consistency. Already impressive
(+57%) in humans, the average gain was spectacular in monkeys
with a twice better performance (+111%). Furthermore, not a
single subject, be it monkey or human, showed a negative∆ indica-
tive of disadvantageous social learning. Only the amplitude of the
advantage provided by social learning varied (from 0 to +188%).
The poorer the subject’s personal ability to correct his/her errors,
the greater the superiority of social learning.
Learning from errors and related response inhibition are
altered by diseases that interfere with dopaminergic function
such as Parkinson’s disease (Frank et al., 2004) and Attention
Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (Braet et al., 2011). Individual vari-
ations in these skills in healthy subjects have been linked to genetic
differences in dopaminergic function in both humans (Klein et al.,
2007; Frank et al., 2009) and macaques (Morgan et al., 2002; Czoty
et al., 2005). In light of the present data, genetically determined
poor ability to correct personal errors may have a bright side in
the form of greater proficiency to learn from others’ errors.
INDIVIDUAL LEARNING SUPERIORITY AFTER POSITIVE OUTCOME
EXISTS IN BOTH SPECIES, BUT NOT IN ALL SUBJECTS
For positive outcome, 5/6 monkeys and 6/12 humans did present
the predicted null to negative ∆s indicating that they learned as
well or better individually than socially. Though modest (23%), the
gain provided by individual learning was significant. These data
therefore proved that our dual prediction successfully accounted
for the behavior of a majority of subjects (61%). This said, how-
ever, there remained an intriguing substantial minority of subjects
for whom social learning unexpectedly remained superior even
for positive outcome. The benefit was again modest (31%) but
significant. Across all 18 subjects, learning∆s were linked to social
rather than individual learning scores, suggesting that, this time,
social dynamics within the actor/observer dyad were responsi-
ble for inter-individual variations. Supporting this idea was the
fact that, within each and every human dyad, one subject favored
individual learning, while the other favored social learning.
In monkeys, the unexpected profile of social learning superi-
ority occurred only in the high-ranking male whose dominance
was associated with a monopolization of both food and attention.
In humans, subjects self-assessed their social styles using a scale
measuring assertive, passive, aggressive, and manipulative behav-
iors. Manipulation being an indirect form of aggression (Hess and
Hagen, 2006), scores for the latter two categories were cumulated.
Though crude, this self-assessment pinpointed a potential char-
acteristic associated with high social learning proficiency. Namely,
the unexpected social learning superiority generally occurred in
the member of the pair with the stronger tendency to resort to
direct and/or indirect aggression in daily-life. This finding is rem-
iniscent of that seen in pairs of chimpanzees, mangabeys, and
rhesus macaques, in which the dominant individual exploits the
activities of the subordinate (Menzel, 1973; Coussi-Korbel, 1994;
Drea and Wallen, 1999). High rank confers substantial social
advantages in many primates including humans (Shively, 1998;
Sapolsky, 2005; Zink et al., 2008; Ly et al., 2011), the present data
suggest a link between dominance and social learning proficiency
that certainly deserves to be further explored.
COULD FACTORS OTHER THAN CHOICE ABSENCE EXPLAIN WHY IT IS
SO MUCH EASIER TO LEARN FROM OTHERS’ ERRORS THAN FROM
PERSONAL ONES?
At least three factors differ between social and individual learn-
ing from errors: choice (missing vs. mandatory), but also action
(observed vs. executed), and failure to obtain a reward (vicarious
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vs. experienced). That observed action and vicarious feedback
could be more efficient than executed action and experienced
feedback is counterintuitive (Bandura, 1977). In addition, there
is no evidence that the brain codes others’ action or errors more
effectively than one’s own. The primate brain does differentiate
others’ action from self-action (Yoshida et al., 2011) and others’
failure to get a reward from one’s own (Yu and Zhou, 2006; Belle-
baum et al., 2010; Burke et al., 2010). Yet, there is massive evidence
that observed and executed actions share the same neural code
(mirror neurons, e.g., Bonini and Ferrari, 2011) as do vicarious
and experienced negative feedback (error/feedback-related neg-
ativity, van Schie et al., 2004; Yu and Zhou, 2006; Shane et al.,
2008). We confirmed this in a recent fMRI study showing that the
same parieto-frontal brain network subserves stimulus-response
associations whether they were acquired via social or individual
feedback-based learning (Monfardini et al., 2008).
Choice therefore seems to be the main culprit behind the huge
difference in social and individual learning effectiveness after a
single negative outcome. O’Doherty (2004) and Bellebaum et al.
(2012) demonstrated that striatum activation during reinforce-
ment learning tasks depend on whether or not subjects have to
perform a response to receive reward. The literature on choice-
induced preference goes further by affirming that commitment to
a stimulus alters its hedonic value,a change accompanied by a post-
decision increase of caudate activation for the selected option, and
a decrease of caudate activation for the rejected ones (Sharot et al.,
2009; Izuma et al., 2010). This means in our protocol a revaluation
of the object that will, only moments later, prove unrewarded. The
present behavioral data suggest that this early choice-driven value
change can be powerful enough to totally obliterate the subse-
quent outcome-driven value change. Research in neuroscience has
heretofore focused on bottom-up modulation of value by decision
outcome (reinforcement learning), choice-induced preference is
an example of top-down cognitive modulation of value based on
decision itself.
SOCIAL LEARNING AS AWAY TO OVERCOME POOR CAPACITY TO
LEARN FROM ONE’S OWN ERRORS?
Examples of how humans and other animal species fall prey of
their own errors are not limited to reinforcement learning, sev-
eral have been reported by psychology and neuroeconomics. The
Concorde fallacy (also known as the sunk-cost effect) is one we
share with lower animals such as wasps and pigeons. Named after
the supersonic airplane to refer to hopeless endeavors that we keep
pursuing because we have already invested too much in them to
quit, this irrational persistence operates only in those involved in
the initial decision (Navarro and Fantino, 2005). More specific
to humans are the action-observer bias, the tendency to attribute
others’ failures to their personality, and one’s own failures to the
situation (Jones and Nisbett, 1971), and the optimistic bias, the
systematic tendency to overestimate the outcome of our actions
(Sharot et al., 2011). All of these biases indicate that the value of an
option is not always rationally updated after a negative outcome.
Thus, seeing the world from one’s sole perspective does not always
allow to reliably tell good from bad. By providing us with a differ-
ent perspective, social leaning could be a way to counterbalance
the shortcomings of personal valuation processes.
CONCLUSION
Social learning is currently receiving much theoretical attention.
Yet, too few controlled studies have compared the usefulness of the
exact same amount information acquired individually vs. socially
to obtain an accurate empirical picture of the factors that deter-
mine the best way to learn. The present study identifies one of these
factors, namely, choice and the preference it is known to induce
for selected options. It thus reinforces models emphasizing social
learning benefits. Indeed, in addition of saving effort and time and
allowing knowledge accumulation over generations, social learn-
ing could also be a protection against potentially harmful personal
biases. Social learning nevertheless has its limits and these limits
may vary across subjects depending on their social characteristics.
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